A second limitation of the data is that it is not able to identify the only reference agreements. This is important because the question of whether the executive agreement should replace the treaty in its entirety is raised only from the perspective of agreements between Congress and the executive branch; it is generally accepted that executive agreements are very different political instruments, which fall under the presidential power and do not require legislative participation. Footnote 81 The reason for the inability to individually identify exclusive executive agreements is that neither TIF nor the executive agreements themselves indicate their licensing rules. Therefore, the identification of exclusive executive agreements would require a search for licensing laws for each executive convention in the Broad Statute, a process that requires an unenforceable workforce and cannot simply be automated. However, previous studies have shown that the share of single executive agreements is minimal, with an estimated share of 5% to 6% in all international agreements. Footnote 83 The analysis below deals with this restriction through a conservative estimation method. Footnote 84 50 Martin, supra note 15 (with a formal signalling model in which the cost of the agreement determines its credibility). If you need help with contract research, visit the Help for Research page on the Georgetown University Law Library website. Or contact the Law Library`s international and foreign law department by phone (202-662-4195) or email (email@example.com). Students at the Georgetown Law Centre can arrange a one-on-one research consultation with a librarian. 11 Hathaway, above 1, circa 1285 (on the grounds that historical conventions explain the application of the treaty). Bradley, Curtis A.
& Morrison, Trevor W., Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 474 (2012) (arguing that the implementation of the treaty can be explained, at least in part, by selective Senate attention, which is devoted to “big” agreements). Hathaway completes his theory with an empirical evaluation of 3,119 agreements concluded between 1980 and 2000. It finds that the observed model of contract use is inconsistent with theories that attribute the treaty to a different quality from the executive agreement of Congress. Instead, Hathaway argues that the best way to explain the use of the contract instrument is a historical lens. Footnote 42 In your view, the prevalence of the agreement between Congress and the executive branch is the result of Congress` desire to remove barriers to trade after World War II, which required greater flexibility and authority for the president in negotiating trade agreements.
Footnote 43 This has led to the conventional application of congressional executive agreements in commercial (and financial) affairs. In other areas such as human rights, the debate was highly politicized and Congress had no desire to give up the sovereignty of the nation, which is subject to the lower legal bar set by the agreement between Congress and the executive branch. There is an active scientific debate about the extent of the president`s power to withdraw the United States from its international agreements, with particular emphasis on whether the constitutional barriers to denouncing agreements between Congress and the executive branch are greater than those of the treaty. Footnote 113 The results of this study indicate that in addition to educational issues, an analysis of political economy can also provide valuable lessons.